By Professor Haris Aziz

Preprints

Aziz H; Lederer P; Lu X; Suzuki M; Vollen J, 2025, Approximately Fair and Population Consistent Budget Division via Simple Payment Schemes, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2412.02435

Aziz H; Csáji G; Biró P, 2024, Ex-post Stability under Two-Sided Matching: Complexity and Characterization, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2411.14821

Aziz H; Lu X; Suzuki M; Vollen J; Walsh T, 2024, Fair Lotteries for Participatory Budgeting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2404.05198

Aziz H; Csáji G; Cseh Á, 2023, Computational complexity of $k$-stable matchings, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2307.03794

Aziz H; Lee BE; Chu SM; Vollen J, 2023, Proportionally Representative Clustering, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2304.13917

Aziz H; Lu X; Suzuki M; Vollen J; Walsh T, 2023, Best-of-Both-Worlds Fairness in Committee Voting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2303.03642

Lu X; Peters J; Aziz H; Bei X; Suksompong W, 2022, Approval-Based Voting with Mixed Goods, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2211.12647

Amanatidis G; Aziz H; Birmpas G; Filos-Ratsikas A; Li B; Moulin H; Voudouris AA; Wu X, 2022, Fair Division of Indivisible Goods: Recent Progress and Open Questions, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2208.08782

Aziz H; Pal A; Pourmiri A; Ramezani F; Sims B, 2022, Task Allocation using a Team of Robots, http://arxiv.org/abs/2207.09650v1

Aziz H; Gujar S; Padala M; Suzuki M; Vollen J, 2022, Coordinating Monetary Contributions in Participatory Budgeting, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2206.05966

Aziz H; Li B; Moulin H; Wu X, 2022, Algorithmic Fair Allocation of Indivisible Items: A Survey and New Questions, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2202.08713

Aziz H; Lam A, 2021, Obvious Manipulability of Voting Rules, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2111.01983

Aziz H; Suksompong W; Sun Z; Walsh T, 2021, Fairness Concepts for Indivisible Items with Externalities, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2110.09066

Aziz H; Baychkov A; Biro P, 2021, Cutoff stability under distributional constraints with an application to summer internship matching, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2102.02931

Aziz H; Li B; Wu X, 2020, Approximate and Strategyproof Maximin Share Allocation of Chores with Ordinal Preferences, http://arxiv.org/abs/2012.13884v1

Aziz H; Brandl F, 2020, The Vigilant Eating Rule: A General Approach for Probabilistic Economic Design with Constraints, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.2008.08991

Aziz H; Shah N, 2020, Participatory Budgeting: Models and Approaches, http://arxiv.org/abs/2003.00606v1

Aziz H; Lee BE, 2020, A characterization of proportionally representative committees, http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.09598v2

Aziz H; Gaspers S; Sun Z; Walsh T, 2020, From Matching with Diversity Constraints to Matching with Regional Quotas, http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.06748v1

Aziz H; Lee BE, 2019, Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting with Ordinal Preferences, http://arxiv.org/abs/1911.00864v2

Aziz H; Moulin H; Sandomirskiy F, 2019, A polynomial-time algorithm for computing a Pareto optimal and almost proportional allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1909.00740

Aziz H; Huang X; Mattei N; Segal-Halevi E, 2019, The Constrained Round Robin Algorithm for Fair and Efficient Allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1908.00161

Aziz H; Caragiannis I; Igarashi A; Walsh T, 2018, Fair allocation of combinations of indivisible goods and chores, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1807.10684

Aziz H; Lee E, 2018, The Temporary Exchange Problem, http://arxiv.org/abs/1807.05514v1

Aziz H, 2018, A Rule for Committee Selection with Soft Diversity Constraints, http://arxiv.org/abs/1803.11437v1

Aziz H; Lang J; Monnot J, 2018, Computing and Testing Pareto Optimal Committees, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1803.06644

Aziz H, 2018, Proportional Representation in Approval-based Committee Voting and Beyond, http://arxiv.org/abs/1802.00882v1

Aziz H; Bogomolnaia A; Moulin H, 2017, Fair mixing: the case of dichotomous preferences, http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.02542v1

Aziz H; Lee B; Talmon N, 2017, Proportionally Representative Participatory Budgeting: Axioms and Algorithms, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1711.08226

Aziz H; Klaus B, 2017, Random Matching under Priorities: Stability and No Envy Concepts, http://arxiv.org/abs/1707.01231v1

Aziz H; Brandl F; Brandt F; Harrenstein P; Olsen M; Peters D, 2017, Fractional Hedonic Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.10116

Segal-Halevi E; Aziz H; Hassidim A, 2017, Fair Allocation based on Diminishing Differences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.07993

Aziz H; Luo P; Rizkallah C, 2017, Rank Maximal Equal Contribution: a Probabilistic Social Choice Function, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1705.00544

Aziz H; Huang S, 2017, A Polynomial-time Algorithm to Achieve Extended Justified Representation, http://arxiv.org/abs/1703.10415v1

Aziz H; Elkind E; Faliszewski P; Lackner M; Skowron P, 2017, The Condorcet Principle for Multiwinner Elections: From Shortlisting to Proportionality, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1701.08023

Aziz H; de Haan R; Rastegari B, 2016, Pareto Optimal Allocation under Uncertain Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1609.02795

Aziz H; Biró P; Gaspers S; de Haan R; Mattei N; Rastegari B, 2016, Stable Matching with Uncertain Linear Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1607.02917

Abeliuk A; Aziz H; Berbeglia G; Gaspers S; Kalina P; Mattei N; Peters D; Stursberg P; Van Hentenryck P; Walsh T, 2016, Interdependent Scheduling Games

Aziz H; Luo P; Rizkallah C, 2016, Incompatibility of Efficiency and Strategyproofness in the Random Assignment Setting with Indifferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.07540

Aziz H; Lev O; Mattei N; Rosenschein JS; Walsh T, 2016, Strategyproof Peer Selection using Randomization, Partitioning, and Apportionment, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.03632

Aziz H; Rauchecker G; Schryen G; Walsh T, 2016, Approximation Algorithms for Max-Min Share Allocations of Indivisible Chores and Goods, http://arxiv.org/abs/1604.01435v1

Aziz H; Biro P; Lang J; Lesca J; Monnot J, 2016, Efficient Reallocation under Additive and Responsive Preferences, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1604.01091

Aziz H, 2016, A Comment on the Averseness of Random Serial Dictatorship to Stochastic Dominance Efficiency, http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.07392v2

Aziz H, 2016, Mechanisms for House Allocation with Existing Tenants under Dichotomous Preferences, http://arxiv.org/abs/1603.03073v2

Aziz H; Bouveret S; Lang J; Mackenzie S, 2016, Complexity of Manipulating Sequential Allocation, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1602.06940

Aziz H; Harrenstein P; Lang J; Wooldridge M, 2015, Boolean Hedonic Games, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1509.07062

Aziz H; Chen J; Filos-Ratsikas A; Mackenzie S; Mattei N, 2015, Egalitarianism of Random Assignment Mechanisms, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1507.06827

Aziz H; Brânzei S; Filos-Ratsikas A; Frederiksen SKS, 2015, The Adjusted Winner Procedure: Characterizations and Equilibria, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1503.06665

Aleksandrov M; Aziz H; Gaspers S; Walsh T, 2015, Online Fair Division: analysing a Food Bank problem, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1502.07571

Aziz H; Seedig HG; von Wedel JK, 2015, On the Susceptibility of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm, http://dx.doi.org/10.48550/arxiv.1502.06318

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